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ESSAYS
REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING LAW &
MEDICINE*
Jay Katz**
In responding to the question, "What comes under the rubric
of a law and medicine course?" I intend to draw on my exper-
iences-now twenty-nine years long-in the world of law and
medicine. Some of my reflections, I hope, will prove instructive to
you.
Teaching, communicating with students, is a very personal ex-
perience. It is shaped by a teacher's personality, philosophy, social-
ization, and commitment as well as by the environment in which
he or she works. The environment is of crucial importance, and the
institution in which I work has decisively influenced my socializa-
tion as a teacher of law and medicine.
Yale Law School and I turned out to be a good fit. The school
allowed me to pursue my interests without any restrictions on sub-
ject matter. I had the freedom to move from the study of criminal
. responsibility, to family law, human experimentation, professional
responsibility in medicine and law, and, most recently, the social
and legal control of reproductive technologies. To this day I con-
sider myself fortunate for having been able to spend most of my
professional life at Yale Law School. The school permitted me to
create my own structure, and there was no scarcity of colleagues
and students to join me in my scholarly pursuits. Had I gone else-
where, my professional life would have turned out differently, for it
is one thing to teach law-medicine courses in a law school (and in
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the University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, on June 6, 1987.
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particular a law school like Yale) and another to teach such courses
in a medical school; it is one thing to teach an interdisciplinary
course alone and another to teach it with colleagues from the other
discipline; it is one thing to be on a faculty on a part-time basis,
with limited opportunities for contact with colleagues and students
and another to be a member of a school's full-time faculty.
I was offered and I accepted a full-time appointment at Yale
Law School, and my office has always been within its building. I
sought such an appointment, at least for the first few years, be-
cause I felt that a meaningful interdisciplinary working relation-
ship required physical closeness and continuing interactions with
faculty and students.
During the first decade I always taught jointly with law-
trained colleagues. They taught me law and I taught them psychia-
try and medicine. While occasionally I taught seminars with vari-
ous faculty members-Richard Donnelly, Fowler Harper, Abraham
Goldstein, Harold Lasswell, to name a few-I was most intensely
involved with one colleague, Joseph Goldstein. Ours was a special
working relationship, which I believe was rare in the annals of in-
terdisciplinary collaboration. I want to describe to you briefly how
we worked-not that many of you will be able to duplicate our
arrangements because they require the fortuitous coming together
of two crazy characters. Nevertheless, I wish to describe to you our
work life, because our arrangement, in less intense form, is perhaps
one of the best ways to carryon interdisciplinary teaching and
writing.
Joe and I spent an incredible amount of time together-six to
eight hours a day, three to four days a week, spring, summer, fall,
and winter. Almost every word we wrote, every page we read, we
wrote and read together. We literally worked elbow-to-elbow: pre-
paring intensively for each class, debriefing one another afterwards
and dissecting what we thought had worked well or badly. A num-
ber of articles on psychiatry and law! and two case books-The
Family and the Law2 and Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry and
1. Goldstein & Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness-Some Observations on the
Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960), si-
multaneously published in 131 J. NERV. & MENT. DIS. 404 (1960); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish
the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963), simultaneously published in
138 J. NERV. & MENT. DIS. 57 (1964).
2. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, THE FAMILY AND THE LAW (1965).
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Law3-constitute the written products of our collaboration.
In our articles, case books, and teaching, we largely raised
questions. Trying to formulate the right questions and engaging
ourselves and our students in a continuous dialogue, rather than
giving authoritative answers, were our objectives. Joe and I fought
vigorously about any answers we gave to our questions, but ulti-
mately we were more concerned about the questions. We thought
deeply about the right questions that needed to be posed. Our
quest to identify the important questions, as well as our capacity
(call it neurotic, if you will) for hard work, were the intellectual
glue that held us together.
When the time came in our work on family law-the subject
matter we liked the most-to publish our own answers, we began
to disagree on many fundamental issues and eventually decided to
work independently. It was hard to say goodbye. A divorce after a
long and good marriage is painful.
In a final attempt to see whether we could continue to collabo-
rate, we offered a seminar on parent-child problems, with the ob-
jective in mind of examining our differences in the company of our
students. It was one of the best seminars that we had ever taught.
Surrounded by twenty students, Joe and I devoted one of the two
hours of every seminar to debating issues raised by the assigned
materials. The debate was intense, relentless, and searching. We
continued to disagree on many of the basic issues. During the sec-
ond hour we brought the students into the discussion. We felt we
owed that much to them. The students, it turned out, had not felt
left out. They loved the seminar. They particularly loved the first
hour, our debate. They experienced our relentless debate not as a
show, but a marvelous pedagogic method, one of the best ever de-
vised. If it was pedagogy, it was also for real. At the end of the
semester, Joe and I knew that further collaborative work would be
punctuated by too much dissent.
We went our separate, intellectual ways and there are lessons
to be learned from our experiences. They highlight the contribu-
tions which two persons from different disciplines can make to
raising questions but not to answering them. They also highlight
another way of working and teaching collaboratively: a relentless
exploration of differences of views by two teachers from disparate
30 Jo KATZ, Jo GOLDSTEIN, & A DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOAN.u.,\'SlS, PS\"CfUATtW AND LAw
(1967).
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disciplines.
While at present I teach more by myself, I served a long ap-
prenticeship period when I did not do so. I mention this for two
reasons. First, to teach and write effectively in interdisciplinary
fields demands a thorough familiarity with the other discipline. I
cannot think of a better way to acquire this familiarity than
through joint teaching. Second, I do not believe that acquiring dual
degrees is the best answer for effective interdisciplinary teaching
(although this conclusion may be influenced by a personal bias
based on my experience). I almost obtained a law degree. When
Dean Eugene Rostow invited me to join the law school faculty, he
offered me the opportunity, with full pay, to obtain a law degree. I
declined. At the time, I did so because I was tired of being a formal
student, having only recently finished my psychoanalytic training.
Also, my children were beginning school and I did not want to
compete with them. In retrospect, I believe that I made a good
decision. It allowed me both to become a law professor and to
maintain my identity as a physician.
While there are notable exceptions, I have met too many per-
sons with joint degrees who, I believe, suffer from an identify diffu-
sion, not knowing whether they are lawyers or physicians, and then
being neither. To be sure, specific reasons-such as wishing to ap-
ply one's prior medical training in the practice of law or a prefer-
ence to work by oneself-may require obtaining degrees in two dis-
ciplines. Thus, I only wish to emphasize that an equally good way
of mastering the knowledge of another discipline is through inten-
sive collaboration with a person from that discipline.
So far I have said nothing about the question, "What comes
under the rubric of a law and medicine course?" Instead, I have
addressed another question: "What comes under the rubric of a
law and medicine teacher?" I wish to pursue for a while longer this
second question. After all, it is the teacher who creates the course.
My socialization as a teacher began at Yale Law School. Prior
to that time, I not only had attended one of the best medical
schools, but also had been a teacher at Yale Medical School.
Teaching is a task not taken very seriously at medical schools. The
intellectual dimension of medical schools is research; the rest is the
onerous obligation of teaching a craft to students and residents.
Moreover, during my socialization as student and teacher at
medical school I had been lectured to death and, in turn, lectured
my students to death. At the law school, I was introduced to the
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"Socratic" method. I took to it like a fish takes to water. I became
enchanted with thinking about questions, trying to formulate the
right questions, with each answer leading to new questions. Of
course, the task was not merely to think of questions, but of ques-
tions that, as my colleague Harold Lasswell once put it, "jarred the
cakes of custom,'" that illuminated hidden problems, that opened
up problems in law and medicine to scholarly inquiry.
Thus, my approach to interdisciplinary teaching was not to
make physicians out of law students or to teach students the law
(although they learned much about medicine and law in the pro-
cess). Instead, I wanted to convey to my students that on the play-
ing fields of law and medicine they will be confronted with intrigu-
ing and complex questions that take time to identify. While
questions often will be in need of answers because a particular sit-
uation requires decision, they will be only the best answers for the
moment, not the answer for all times or for all situations. If one
wishes to find answers that transcend the moment, one must first
relentlessly search for the right questions.
My most recent work on doctor-patient interactions in thera-
peutic settings,Ii particularly my exploration of the problem of
medical uncertainty,s was heavily influenced by what I had learned
as a teacher in a law school. My experiences in medical school had
led me to believe that answers can be provided without prior care-
ful reflection about the problems for which answers are sought. It
took time for me to appreciate that one must constantly ask
whether the questions one raises have been so influenced by one's
experiences and values that, without reformulating them, they will
not yield relevant answers. These considerations apply not only to
scholarly work but to teaching as well. Thus, the lecture method
employed ill medical school, where one professor, for example, au-
thoritatively holds forth on the treatment of diseases, can mislead
students; for students are taught only what the professor thinks is
the right answer to the question of how to treat a particular dis-
ease and it is not necessarily the only answer.
Many years ago, I showed my materials on the treatment of
hypertension to one of my former teachers, Herman Blumgart, the
late and revered Harvard Medical School professor of internal
4. Lasswell, The Political Science of Science: An Inquiry into the Possible Reconcilia-
tion of Mastery and Freedom, 50 &L POL. SeL REv. 961, 973 (1956).
5. J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOC'roR AND PATIENT (1984).
6. Id. at 165-206.
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medicine. I had prepared them for inclusion in my book, Experi-
mentation with Human Beings,' but ultimately did not use them
because they turned out to be too complicated for law students to
digest. In these materials I juxtaposed articles that illustrated the
confusion and uncertainty about the right treatment for essential
hypertension. After Herman Blumgart had studied them, he told
me, "What you have done is remarkable. I had not appreciated
before that this is the way to introduce students to the treatment
of hypertension and other diseases; not by doing what I have al-
ways done, to tell students what I believe to be the best treatment
approach." His praise was too generous, but what he said was also
a very perceptive comment by a great man whom I had respected
enormously during my days as a student at Harvard Medical
School.
In what I have said so far, I have tried to convey to you my
basic objectives as a teacher in a professional school: to raise ques-
tions,S to raise consciousness, to make students appreciate that life,
as well as the art and science of law and medicine, are complex,
and that the life of law and medicine becomes even more complex
when the two disciplines meet head on and have to accommodate
themselves to one another.
What comes under the rubric of a law and medicine course?
That question has many answers and I can best give you my an-
swer by telling you what I have done.
Before briefly describing to you the courses I have offered, let
me only mention in passing that I have never offered a traditional
forensic seminar on law and medicine. For example, I have never
taught students much, if anything, about medical proof in litiga-
tion (such as the use of medical records, photograhy, X-rays, and
court room demonstration of medical proof), malpractice law issues
(such as res ipsa loquitur, good Samaritan laws, and statutes of
7. J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1972) (with the assistance of Alex-
ander M. Capron and Eleanor Swift Glass).
8. In emphasizing "raising questions" as my primary objective in teaching, I do not
wish to dismiss the importance of providing medical and law students with background
materials about their own and other disciplines. Such materials, however, can only give stu-
dents sufficient information to raise meaningful questions, to know when they have to learn
more about their own or the other discipline's problems, and to avoid the pitfalls of finding
answers only on the basis of "hypotheticals" (an all too common teaching device in law
schools). Answers based on hypotheticals are often misleading because the information pro-
vided does not sufficiently depict the complexities either of the problem presented or of
underlying legal and medical theories and professional practices.
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limitation), the legal definition of death, or the ins and outs of the
insanity defense and other competency determinations. Even
though such teaching has its usefulness, I have had no experience
with it.
Since such courses are often presented in black letter law fash-
ion, let me interject one caveat that. is particularly relevant to
teaching law to medical students. Medical students are socialized
to eschew uncertainty. Thus, if law is presented to medical stu-
dents in black letter form, the danger is great that they will not
appreciate that, legal rules notwithstanding, physicians at times
must place professional responsibilities ahead of legal prescrip-
tions. Physicians must sometimes expose themselves to legalliabil-
ity when, in the exercise of their professional responsibility to pa-
tients, they must challenge legal doctrine. Similarly, physicians
must, in fulfi1ling their responsibilities to their chosen profession
and to society, participate in reforming laws so that they ",rill com-
port better with good patient care.
In my own teaching I have always cast my net wide. A few
excerpts from the introduction to my case book, Experimentation
with Human Beings, will give you not only an appreciation of the
scope of my inquiries in a specific area of law and medicine, but
also a flavor of my overall approach to teaching:
When science takes man as its subject, tensions arise between two
values basic to Western society: freedom of scientific inquiry and
protection of individual inviolability. Both are facets of man's
quest to order his world. Scientific research has given man some,
albeit incomplete, knowledge and tools to tame his environment,
while commitment to individual worth and autonomy, however
wavering, has limited man's intrusions on man. Yet when human
beings become the subject of experimentation, allegiance to one
value invites neglect of the other. At the heart of this conflict lies
an age-old question: When maya society, actively or by acquies-
cence, expose some of its members to harm in order to seek bene-
fits for them, for others, or for society as a whole?
Recent experience with human experimentation in a variety
of disciplines has prompted renewed concern among the profes-
sions and the public that the present regulation of the research
process is unsatisfactory. Some critics call for increased govern-
mental controls, more detailed codes of ethics, more powerful
professional review committees, or more active participation of
nonscientists in research decisions. Others fear that involvement
of outsiders or more stringent controls will "put a ceiling price on
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truth" and dry up all reservoirs of creativity and scientific pro-
gress. Yet perhaps the most pervasive viewpoint is that experi-
mentation cannot be rationally controlled. Before accepting any
of these judgments it is the task of the student of human experi-
mentation to seek answers to three questions: (1) What limits, if
any, should be placed on scientific inquiry, and what implications
do these limits have for society's democratic and egalitarian aspi-
rations? (2) Who should have the authority to formulate these
limits? (3) By what means should they be imposed?
In searching for answers to these questions, this book exam-
ines and evaluates the authority which should be vested in each
of the chief participants in the human experimentation pro-
cess-the investigator who initiates and conducts the experiment,
the human being who is its subject, and the professions and the
state which appraise, support, or restrict research.
. . . This volume includes experimental studies from several
disciplines-medicine, psychology, sociology, biology, and
law-and materials from many sources-trial transcripts, con-
gressional hearings, panel discussions, appellate decisions, admin-
istrative regulations, editorial comments, legislation, private
agreements, scholarly publications, and newspaper stories. These
have been interwoven with commentary from philosophy, political
science, economics, genetics, medicine, anthropology, psychoanal-
ysis, biology, jurisprudence, psychology, theology, and literature.
Both the relevance and the reliability of these materials, as data
and as evaluations, must be subjected to critical appraisal. Scruti-
nizing case studies about events in the past can sometimes seem
petty, sterile, or disheartening. Yet any hope for a better and
more thoughtful resolution of the issues in the future depends on
our willingness to engage in unstinting examination of the past, as
imperfectly as it may be recalled
... If this book in some measure documents man's inhu-
manity to man, it only serves to remind us how pervasive that
phenomenon is. Human experimentation has been severely criti-
cized on this ground. Yet in raising questions about experimenta-
tion we do not intend to indict science or stifle research, for the
failure to experiment is equally an experiment which may also
have unsatisfactory consequences. The real need to which this
volume speaks is for greater conscious awareness and relentless
scholarly analysis of the conflicting purposes of human experi-
mentation-protecting man, advancing science, and improving
the well-being of society and future generations. Only if students
and decisionmakers are prepared to sort out these conflicts and to
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acknowledge the reality of harm to individuals and society can
they begin to formulate rules and procedures which will minimize
harm without erecting insuperable impediments to the acquisi-
tion of knowledge. In addressing this task for human experimen-
tation, significant contributions may also be made to decision-
making in other areas of law, science, and politics, for the
conflicts presented in this volume are inherent in all affairs con-
ducted by and with man.a
Let me add a few excerpts from an earlier case book,
coauthored by Joseph Goldstein and me, The Family and the Law:
The question underlying all of these general and specific ques-
tions is whether, how, and to what extent the state should not or
should be authorized to regulate the relations of man. In answer-
ing this question the decisionmaker must resolve the important
issue of why, when, and how the state ought or ought not to inter-
vene. It should not be assumed, however, that he will respond ra-
tionally "[e]ven if the materials are sufficiently relevant and valid
to fully support or undermine a given position. Like all human
beings he is subject to a variety of internal and external, con-
scious and unconscious, pressures which may evoke a decision
contrary to that sought. Awareness of this makes it all the more
important that we seek to design our model of [the family law
process] carefully and free from second guesses about possible
pressures. For models built on the sand of anticipated com-
promises obscure and hinder the development of well articulated
objectives which ought to be available as guides to and bases for
appraising the work of decisionmakers."10
The reader who opens himself to these questions and materi-
als will be unable to keep his thoughts from straying to reflections
about himself and his families. This may cause feelings of uneasi-
ness, particularly if the boundary between the people in the
materials and those in personal fantasy become hazy. Such an ex-
perience can be likened to that of the medical student who fre-
quently "suffers" from all of the symptoms he is studying in his
text books. "As a matter of fact, it is most unsatisfactory to be
immune to 'medical students' disease.' A touch of the ailment is a
sign that the reader is really opening himself to his subject, trying
to grasp it and feel it rather than just reading about it."ll
9. J. KATZ, supra note 7, at 1-5.
10. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, supra note 2, at 4 (footnote omitted) (quoting R. DON-
NELLY. J. GoLDSTEIN, & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAw, iv (1962».
11. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, supra note 2, at 4 (footnote omitted) (quoting R. WHlTB.
THE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 58 (2d ed. 1956».
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In preparing this book we have come to hope that it might
have a place in the tradition for which Mr. Justice Frankfurter
spoke in one of his dissents:
"To be writing [a casebook affecting many] lives after the
curtain has been rung down upon them has the appearance of pa-
thetic futility. But history also has its claims. This [book, we
hope] is an incident in the long and unending effort to develop
and enforce justice according to law. The progress in that struggle
surely depends on searching analysis of the past, though the past
cannot be recalled, as illumination for the future. Only by sturdy
self-examination and self-criticism can the necessary habits for
detached and wise judgment be established and fortified so as to
become effective when the judicial process is again subjected to
stress and strain."12
Law, like man, meets the need for continuity and stability by
listening to precedent and rule as guides for decision. And law,
like man, meets the need for flexibility and adaptability by mak-
ing available for selection alternative precedents and rules (some-
times called counter-precedent and counterrule) as guides for de-
cision. Thus law, like man, in search of autonomy and identity
must integrate these needs and become aware of both the values
exerting pressure and the values to be preferred in each decision.
We have designed this book, then, to encourage students and
decisionmakers in law to develop the capacity to communicate
with and understand the communication of many disciplines, to
appraise and assess their relevance, and to speculate about their
many wonderful and frightening implications for the future of the
family and society. The application of scientific "advances" in
theory and technique must be subject to advance thinking by law-
yers concerned with the limits of state intervention. Otherwise
much knowledge may be too little and too dangerous for the
health and well being of the family and the law in a democracy.ls
My more recent teaching materials on disclosure and consent
in medicine and law are similar in scope.I " As yet unpublished,
they are designed to explore the general problem of professional
responsibility by focusing on four basic issues: (1) the capacities
that individuals as persons, professionals, and patient-clients bring
to decision-making; (2) the reasonable controls that professional
12. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, supra note 2, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Rosen-
berg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 310 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting».
13. J. GOLDSTEIN & J. KATZ, supra note 2, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
14. J. KATZ, DISCLOSURE AND CONSENT: DECISION-MAKING IN PHYSICIAN-PATIENT AND
LAWYER-CLIENT INTERACTIONS (7th draft Jan. 1983) (not yet published).
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organizations and the state can impose on the interactions between
professionals and patient-clients; (3) the vicissitudes of conscious-
ness and communication, and their impact on understanding one-
self and others; and (4) the constraints which the uncertain state
of the art and science of medicine and law impose on meaningful
disclosure and, in turn, on consent.
The materials are not intended to teach students interviewing
or counselling techniques. Instead, they focus on the capacities of
individuals to engage in, and of institutions to control, decision
making. These problems have not been given the comprehensive
attention they deserve, even though they are prerequisites to any
systematic study of interviewing in the service of decision making.
The concepts of disclosure and consent guide the inquiry; for ulti-
mately a better appreciation of how to fulfill these two obligations
will significantly affect decision making between professionals and
patient-clients.
The materials are divided into three parts. Part One begins
the analytic inquiry by providing students with basic information
about medicine and law, and its implications for the medical and
legal decision-making processes. Theoretical and clinical materials
on the therapy of breast cancer are presented to familiarize stu-
dents with the complexities of medicine, the certainties and uncer-
tainties inherent in medical knowledge, and the impact of deeply
held professional beliefs on decision making, as well as the difficul-
ties which physicians and patients encounter in their efforts to
communicate with one another.
A study of disclosure and consent in lawyer-client interactions
undertakes the same task for law. The problem of plea bargaining
strikingly illustrates the uncertainties inherent in lawyer-client de-
cision making as well as the similarities and differences between
lawyer-client and doctor-patient interactions. Moreover, other
materials on courts' conflicting responses to the allegation of in-
complete disclosure provide important data about judges' attitudes
toward professionals and their patient-clients.
Finally, in Part One, the contours of disclosure and consent
are explored by tracing the common-law development of consent
and informed consent in professional settings from the late eight-
eenth century to the present. The cases as well as the accompany-
ing commentaries were selected to explore such questions as: Have
the doctrines of consent and informed consent, and their construc-
tion by courts, fulfilled the promise of enhancing patient-clients'
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participation in decision making? If not, why not?
Part Two address the influence of professionalism and self-
determination in shaping disclosure and consent. Two of the three
basic conflicting tensions that shape the disclosure and consent
process are examined: (1) professional authority versus equality
between professionals and patient-clients and (2) attribution of ca-
pacities for self-determination (autonomy) to patient-clients versus
grave doubts about the extent of such capacities.
Background materials for answering these questions are pro-
vided by a case study of Mary Northern, an elderly Tennessee wo-
man who struggled valiantly to remain in control of her fate. Her
refusal to consent to the amputation of her gangrenous legs
brought her in contact with many persons (social workers, police-
men, judges, psychiatrists, guardians ad litem, and surgeons) who
wanted to manage her life for her. Their respective views provide a
wealth of data for the theoretical issues to be explored in subse-
quent sections.
The issue of the nature and scope of authority and equality
confronts the first tension: professional authority versus greater
equality between professionals and patient-clients. Commentaries
on the nature of professions highlight the value preferences that
professionals bring to their interactions with patient-clients as well
as the expectations that both participants have of one another.
Oaths and professional codes depict the views that professionals
have of themselves and their practices. Cases and commentaries on
licensure, malpractice, and "unauthorized" professional activities
permit exploration of the regulatory and supervisory roles that the
state can play. Pleas for self-medication by patients and self-repre-
sentation by clients, without the assistance of professionals, allow
analysis of the limits to be placed on citizens who wish to rely on
their own lay, rather than on professional, authority. Throughout,
one basic question guides the inquiry: To what extent can, and
should, professionals interact with patient-clients on the basis of
equality?
The nature and scope of self-determination is addressed next.
This section begins with commentaries from the political and psy-
chological sciences as well as cases from American constitutional
law in order to identify competing views on self-determination and
to examine underlying assumptions about the capacities of profes-
sionals and patient-clients for autonomous choice. In the final sec-
tion the relevance of the views reached on the nature and scope of
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personal autonomy is evaluated in situations in which patient-cli-
ents refuse treatments deemed necessary for safeguarding their
physical integrity or survival. These latter issues put the principles
of self-determination and paternalism to their severest test.
Part Three explores the impact of uncertainty on disclosure
and consent processes. Here, uncertainty is broadly conceived.
Under this rubric are the uncertainties engendered by (1) the limi-
tation in the current state of professional knowledge and its incom-
plete mastery, (2) the limits of human capacities to understand
themselves and others, and (3) the limits of human capacities and
human willingness to be truthful with themselves and others.
The uncertainties that stalk both the science and practice of
law and medicine are examined first. Materials on the contempo-
rary debate over the use and abuse of "elective" surgery provide
the necessary medical background data. Selected cases from the
law of estates, divorce and personal injury do the same for law.
These materials seek to explore the consequences of professional
uncertainty and how they can be better controlled. Next, the limits
of understanding oneself and others are investigated. This section
turns to the individual participants in the disclosure and consent
process. After studying a variety of clinical encounters between
professionals and their patient-clients, the impact of convictions,
biases, conflicts, experiences, and phantasies that all participants
bring to the disclosure and consent process are explored in consid-
erable detail.
Finally, the limits of fidelity to truthfulness are probed. Here
the requirement for "truthfulness" is compared with physicians'
pleas to be permitted to obscure truth for the sake of compliance
(particularly with frightened patient-clients) and for the sake of
hope (particularly with dying patients). Then materials are intro-
duced to examine the impact of the requirement for truthfulness
on the placebo effect. Since the effectiveness of placebos depends
so much on the unquestioned faith of professionals in their inter-
ventions and of patients in their doctors and therapies, disclosure
of uncertainty may undermine therapeutic effectiveness. These ex-
plorations seek to define the limits of truthfulness and, in turn,
"informed consent," should "medical necessity" require it.
In the course of our work I caution my students that if our
explorations document man's unwillingness and inability to engage
fully in a dialogue based on disclosure and consent, such conclu-
sions should only sensitize them to the limits of human capacities
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to participate in responsible decision making. Such conclusions,
however, should not (as they often have) serve as excuses for dis-
missing attempts to improve communications between profession-
als and their patient-clients. It is physicians' and lawyers' profes-
sional obligation to develop a better appreciation of the nature of
human beings-their motivations, capacities, and limitations-and
a greater willingness to confront the conflicting tensions inherent
in any dialogue with their patient-clients. Finally, I suggest to my
students that in addressing these tasks in their professional work,
they may also learn a great deal about decision making in other
interactions between human beings. The problems we struggle to
understand better in the study of these materials are inherent in
all affairs conducted by and with human beings.
Before concluding, let me say a few words about a new course
on professional responsibility in the practice of medicine that Rob-
ert Levine and I shall teach at Yale Medical School in the spring of
1988. It is a required course for first year medical students during
their second semester. Excerpts from the Task Force Report to the
Medical School's Curriculum Committee illustrate the scope of the
course:
Our objectives can be succinctly stated: To teach medical stu-
dents how to think systematically about the problems of profes-
sional responsibility which they will encounter in the practice of
medicine. The course will focus on basic concepts. Four major
groups impact upon the practice of medicine: physicians (includ-
ing other health care professionals, e.g., nurses, social workers,
physician- associates), patients (including, e.g., members of fam-
ily, intimate friends), the profession (primarily, but not only, the
medical profession and its component organizations, e.g., spe-
cialty groups, Boards, hospital associations, but other profession-
als as well, e.g., osteopaths, unlicensed healers, lawyers), and the
state (e.g., courts, legislatures, Congress, administrative agencies).
The basic question we intend to explore is this: What duties and
obligations should be assigned to each of these groups at various
stages of the medical decision-making process?
While the primary focus of the course will be on problems
that physicians encounter in their interactions with pa-
tients-particularly problems of decision making-we believe
that such an inquiry demands moving beyond the individual phy-
sician-patient relationship and exploring the impact of other soci-
etal institutions on the two parties.
The following observations are illustrative of our specific
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plans for the course's scope:
(1) The course could begin with a case study of the contem-
porary treatments of breast cancer. The controversy over differ-
ent treatment modalities highlights the pervasive problem of
medical uncertainty and its implications for decision making. In
the light of medical uncertainty, many questions require scrutiny:
Can decisions be made unilaterally by physicians-decisions that
are so decisively influenced by the specialities physicians prac-
tice-or must patients be consulted? If the latter, do patients
have the capacity to participate in decision making? What role
should professional organizations play in promulgating rules for
the decision-making dialogue between doctors and patients?
What weight should be given to the "consensus reports," recently
promulgated for the treatment of breast cancer and other dis-
eases? If doctors do not comply with consensus reports, or other
official professional promulgations, what sanctions, if any, should
be imposed on physicians by their professional peers?
(2) We shall then move to the legal doctrine of informed con-
sent and explore the relevance of such jurisprudential principles
as autonomy and self-determination to the physician-patient rela-
tionship. Here the focus begins to shift from the private ordering
of conduct between physicians and patients to socially imposed
regulations. That discussion will extend to the regulation of
medicine by the state-medical practice acts etc.-and the di-
lemma of professional insistence on freedom from lay control, on
the one hand, and asking for state regulation of the practice of
medicine in order to keep unlicensed and unqualified healers
from exploiting the public, on the other. New questions arise:
Should licensure be abolished? Who should be allowed to prac-
tice? Addressing these questions might lead to an exploration of
FDA regulations, now firmly grounded in "efficacy" and "safety",
or dispensing with these requirements and substituting, instead,
full disclosure warnings (vide laetrile).
(3) An examination of contemporary surgical practices \'lill
raise complex questions of physician competence: For example,
how many operations must a surgeon perform in order to main-
tain his competence? If a surgeon's or a hospital's surgical mortal-
ity rates exceed a certain percentage, can negligence be pre-
sumed? Who should monitor competence and surgical
morbidity- the professions or the state? How is negligence to be
defined? These questions can lead to an exploration of the law of
malpractice and its role in defining standards of care.
(4) A more intensive study of medical uncertainty then could
stimulate an exploration of the problems associated with the de-
velopment of new (experimental?) therapies. Who should decide
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when a treatment modality has become acceptable medical prac-
tice? And, until that decision has been made, should the regula-
tion of innovative therapies be different from the regulation of
"accepted" practices?
(5) While, in the above, the focus has already shifted from
the microcosm of the physician-patient relationship to the macro-
cosm of the physician and patient in their interactions with other
societal institutions, that larger focus will require further exten-
sion. For example, the impact on the physician-patient relation-
ship of the contemporary shift from fee for service to third-party
payments, and of DRGs, PSROs, and for-profit hospitals will
have to be scrutinized. Here, problems of free access to health
care (the so-called "right to treatment"), availability of scarce and
expensive treatment modalities, allocation of resources for-health
care vs. other societal priorities deserve exploration. In examining
the impact of societal forces on physicians and patients we intend
to keep our focus on the effect of these external pressures on phy-
sicians' traditional commitment to caring for their individual
patients.l~
I hope that I have conveyed to you my answer to the questions
posed at the beginning: What falls under the rubric of a law and
medicine course, and who falls under the rubric of a law and
medicine teacher? What I attempted to accomplish during my life
as a teacher of law and medicine can be stated simply: to raise
questions. In pursuing that objective, I perhaps was influenced by
a German poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, whom I loved to read as an
adolescent. In Letters to a Young Poet, he wrote:
Sie sind so jung, so vor allem Anfang, und ich mochte Sie, so gut
ich es kann, bitten, lieber Herr, Geduld zu haben gegen alles Un-
gelOste in Ihrem Herzen und zu versuchen, die Fragen selbst
liebzuhaben wie verschlossene Stuben und wie Bucher, die in
einer sehr fremden Sprache geschrieben sind. Forschen Sie jetzt
nicht nach den Antworten, die Ihnen nicht gegeben werden kon-
nen, weil Sie sie nicht leben konnten. Dnd es handelt sich darum,
alles zu leben. Leben Sie jetzt die Fragen. Vielleicht leben Sie
dann allmahlich, ohne es zu merken, eines fernen Tages in die
Antwort hinein.16
15. Task Force for Developing a Course for Medical Students on Professional Respon-
sibility, Final Report (July 30, 1986). The members of the Task Force consisted of Profes-
sors Raymond S. Duff, Angela R. Holder, Lorraine V. Klerman, Robert J. Levine, Melvin
Lewis, Theodore R. Marmor, Arthur J. Viseltear, and J. Katz (Chair).
16. Letter by Ranier Maria Rilke at Bremen (JuJ. 16, 1903), reprinted in R. RILKE,
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You are so young, so before all beginning, and I want to beg you,
as much as I can, dear sir [and let me add, dear madam], to be
patient towards all that is unsolved in your heart and to try to
love the questions themselves like locked rooms and like books
that are written in a very foreign tongue. Do not now seek the
answers, that cannot be given you because you would not be able
to live them. And the point is, to live everything. Live the ques-
tions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it,
live along some distant day into the answer.17
I have lived and still live the questions. I also beg you to live
the questions in your teaching of future generations of profession-
als. I have raised two generations of students on these questions.
Many of them are now renowned teachers. The best of them con-
tinue to raise questions.
BRIEFE AN ElNEN JUNGEN DICHTER 23 (1951).
17. R. RaKE, LETTERS TO A YOUNG POET 33-34 (H. Norton trans. 1954) (emphasis
added).
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